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Public choice still young and going strong at the age of 60! 

This is a collection of articles by leading scholars in the field of Public Choice, including a Nobel laureate, who were invited by the editors, themselves distinguished researchers in the area, to “assess the state of public choice literature and to offer their thoughts about future directions of research”. The collection contains eleven papers, each paper dealing with a specific area of research, and an introduction and a concluding chapter by the editors. The volume offers facts, theoretical surveys, statistical evidence, new insights and suggestions for further research. 

Public Choice theory, we may recall, applies the principles of economic analysis to political decision-making. In accordance to standard economic analysis, it assumes that all actors, private individuals as well as public office holders, choose the actions which maximize their utility given the constraints, financial and institutional. It studies what political actors, motivated by self-interest, actually do rather than what they should do, and has turned on its head accounts of government behaviour which assumed that benevolent officials pursue policies in the “public interest”. Over the past sixty years the public choice inquiry has engaged in an exciting research agenda covering amongst other topics the origins of the state; the reasons why people vote; the properties of voting rules; majority voting; political parties, politicians and institutions of representative democracy; bureaucracy; interest groups; rent seeking; the size of government; federalism and political business cycle. The list has been rapidly expanding and the literature on each topic has been increasing as flicking through the pages of any contemporary book in public choice attests. 

The present collection of articles is a joy to read. Each one of the articles, approximately twenty pages long, deals with a particular topic, contains a short literature review, the main argument pursued by its author and suggestions for further research. The eleven papers are a blend of “old” and “new” topics with voting procedures, federalism, growth of government, political campaign finance and direct democracy prominent amongst the former, and transnational terrorism, corporate governance, school vouchers and use of litigation prominent amongst the latter. But irrespective of whether the topics are new or old, they are analyzed under a critical and innovative eye. 

In “Afraid to be free: Dependency as desideratum” Buchanan (Nobel laureate 1986) argues that socialism, defined to include the range and scope of controls by collective institutions over individual liberty of actions, will survive and increase in the first half of the 21st century. The reason, he argues, is that many individuals do not want to carry the responsibility for their own actions (“are afraid to be free”) and prefer the state to take its “parental” role (a role whose origins are traced back to the Enlightenment) protecting them from the uncertainties, economic and other, of life. The expansionary trend will be broken only when the demand for such dependency leads to unsustainable claims for taxable capacity. When individuals realize that the state will no longer take care of them, they will consider transfer programmes to specific groups as discriminatory and withdraw their support for them. This logic is inescapable, what seems to be open to question is whether individuals, who do not want to shoulder the responsibility of liberty, may still shy away from freedom and seek solace in another surrogate parent. After all, as Buchanan argues, the state assumed the role of the “parent” after the institution of the church ceased to be seen as offering such parental protection. 

Charles Rowley’s paper “Fragmenting parchment and the winds of war: The Constitution of the United States, 1860-2004” documents how the US federal government has repeatedly exploited security threats to infringe and even negate constitutional rights to life, liberty and property. The setting for this work is the conflict between the political philosophies of Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes sees the state as the defender of peace and order against anarchy and as such fit to be endowed with the powers to force individuals to act according to reason and not passion. On the other hand, Locke sees the state as an institution to guarantee and protect the rights of individuals to life, liberty and property and recognizes the right of individuals to resist oppressive government. Rowley then goes on to argue that the Founding Fathers of the US constitution resolved the dilemma in favour of the Lockeian view. However, the executive and legislative branches used security threats to erode constitutional guarantees of individual rights. Rowley documents how in five occasions, the Civil War (1861-65), the First World War (1917-18), the Second World War (1941-45), the Cold War (1947-90) and the War on Terror (2001-), the federal government violated the constitution by amongst other actions detaining civilian critics without trial, introducing aspects of command economy, undermining privacy protection and eliminating judicial oversight of intelligence agencies. He expresses a pessimistic view that when faced with national security pressures the Lockeian principles of liberty buckle and give way. An innovative and very attractive aspect of Rowley’s contribution is that he documents his argument not only by referring to the measures taken by the executive and legislative branches but also by presenting a long list of US Supreme Court - “the least dangerous” arm of government - rulings which undermine civil and economies liberties. Perhaps this mode of analysis signals a particularly fruitful avenue of empirical research in public choice aiming to understand the nexus between independent judicial review and judicial activism. 

In “Constitutional political economy and the European Union” Dennis Mueller surveys recent research on the effects of political institutions on economic outcomes like growth, the size of the public sector, the budget deficit and so on. He casts his net widely to include constitutional protection of property rights and economic liberties, legal constraints, like the legal system of a country (common or civil law), electoral rules (first-past-the-post, or proportional representation), systems of governance (presidential or parliamentary), legislative systems (single-chamber or bi-cameral), direct or indirect democracy and federalism. He then discusses how the insight gained from the literature may be applied to the recent institutional changes in the EU and the Transition Economies. Policy making in the EU is based on awarding different weights to different member-states and on applying qualified majority voting rules in its deliberations. The adoption of a market system and the development of democratic political institutions in the ex-socialist countries, as well as the proposed EU constitutional treaty opened new opportunities to apply some of the lessons learned from positive and normative public choice analysis. However, these opportunities were missed. Constitutional drafting in Russia and the EU violated what Mueller calls “the first law of constitution writing”, that is, those who are likely to hold office under the new constitution should not be involved in writing the constitution because they may establish institutions which serve their own interests rather than those of the citizens. In this light it may not come as a surprise that the Constitution was rejected by the voters in the French and the Dutch referendums of 2005 but received comfortable majorities in all countries which sought to ratify it through a parliamentary vote. 

The focus of the fourth essay is terrorism, the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or sub-national groups to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims. In “Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism”, Todd Sandler, one of the pioneers in the application of the rational model to the analysis of terrorism, notes how terrorism generates transnational and intertemporal externalities, uses game theory to analyze the strategic interaction between states and terrorist organization, and comments on how concerns about terrorism affect the perennial dilemma between freedom and security. First, he notes that the nation v terrorist game is characterized by a number of asymmetries: governments are large, hierarchical organizations and offer a multitude of targets, terrorists comprise small, loose cells, often with the ability to inflict big losses; information about government activities is easier to obtain than information about terrorists; politicians in government facing re-election constraints have shorter time horizons than terrorist organizations and may opt for short-run fixes at the expense of longer-run national interests; different terrorist organizations are easier to co-operate, different nations are not. Using non cooperative game theory, Sandler then studies preemptive and defensive measures (respectively a military strike and upgrading security for a domestic target) and the dilemmas arising in coordinating responses, like freezing of terrorists’ assets and denying them weapons or sanctuary. Preemptive strikes may suffer from too little action, in the sense that too few nations may take part in them preferring to free ride on another nation’s response. Deterrence measures may suffer from too much action, in the sense that one nation strengthens its own defenses so much that terrorists direct their activities against other less defended nations. Freezing terrorists’ asset is an assurance game where both the affected nations are better off by taking identical actions, but if only one nation acts that nation receives the smallest payoff while the nation which does nothing receives the second-highest. The essay ends by pointing out the irony that democracies offer a more favourable environment for terrorist activities than autocracies. Clearly, there are formidable problems in securing a coordinated approach to terrorism, but not all is doom and gloom: Sandler hopes that as nations become aware of the gains from cooperation the chances of coordination increase. 

The spectacular growth of the size of government has been one of the most significant economic changes of the 20th century. In the fifth essay “Government growth in the twenty-first century” Randall Holcombe dwells on this issue. He distinguishes between three strands of models, namely, budget-maximization, rational-choice and path-dependent. The former includes models of bureaucrats and politicians assumed to maximize the tax revenue they can extract from the economy. Rational-choice models cover the factors operating on the demand side and collective decision mechanisms which translate voter preferences to public sector outcomes. Path-dependency hypotheses view “government growth as a series of ratchets upwards in government spending in response to [political and social] crises”. Government spending increases during the crisis, but never returns to its pre-crisis level after the emergency is over. Hence, the time profile of government expenditures depends on its past record in a way that cannot be captured by comparative static properties. Holcombe recognizes that path-dependency models lack the rigorous underpinnings of rational choice models. He argues that they are a useful alternative paradigm in collective choices where the principles of utility maximization may not hold and status-quo biases may in practice hold significant sway. In the course of his essay he also clarifies an important methodological point. Models of the size of government explain government growth as “the first derivative” of the size of government, so that if the factors which determine the size change so will the size of government. This implies that if a change which causes government growth is reversed, the size of government would shrink. However, if path-dependency is the main cause of growth, once government has grown it is more difficult to reverse. Holcombe then reviews the time profile of US public sector expenditure in the 19th and 20th century and concludes that the stylized facts are more consistent with budget-maximization and path-dependency. Yet, the difference between tax availability and demand-driven explanation of government growth may be more apparent than real, for it is possible to construct integrative models of government size which combine all three important elements cited by Holcombe, demand for government expenditure programmes, supply of tax revenue and institutions of collective choice which mediate demand and supply - see Tridimas and Winer (2005). Similarly, rather than treating path-dependency as ad hoc shifts of the previous established path, such displacements, when they occur, can be thought as defining a change in voter preferences and a change in political influence and hence change the pattern and the growth of government expenditures.

The sixth essay by Michael Munger, “Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first century”, scrutinizes the insights of public choice theory into voting procedures. He makes two main points: First, the technology of recording and counting votes is often behind the times. Second, too much is often expected from the mechanisms of democratic choice which may then lead to disappointment. The former point, rather neglected in public choice writings, is motivated by the 2000 US presidential election experience and how the final result revolved around the use of punch card machines in Florida. Munger’s second point on inflated expectations of democracy, opens with an account of the basic tenet of social choice theory that in the face of disagreement between voters no consensus can be reached, unless the domain is restricted (some voter preferences are excluded), or the choice is left to a dictator. Neither of these roads to consensus is appealing, yet people seem to value consensus. It is this dilemma which gives rise to inflated expectations from the mechanisms of democratic choice. For those who want to defend democracy as a system which leads to good government based on the will of the people a sad realisation dawns: The general will of the voters cannot be discovered by a procedure which counts individual preferences, such as voting. This insight also explains the disappointment with the performance of newly democratized countries after the collapse of communism in Europe and in Asia. Public choice shows that “all selection procedures will have an element of arbitrariness” and that “…the majority preference is simply what most people happen to think. It has no moral force, other than as a means of resolving disputes”. Munger then evaluates and in the end rejects proposals for reforming the Electoral College system by which the US President is elected, on the ground that there is no better system for “controlling political excesses and forcing presidential candidates to represent the entire nation”. If the superiority of democracy - understood as the application of some form of majority rule - is not founded in its ability to choose for all, then what justifies its claim? Munger argues that the answer lies in a form of “equality of opportunity” that it offers, presumably (as the author does not elaborate this issue) to allow voters to express their views and allow candidates to compete for office on a level playing field. Munger is concerned that the level playing field is eroded by contemporary political parties which take advantage of technological change in the form of advertising and campaigning to erect barriers to entry. 

The role of money in politics is the focus of the seventh essay written by Thomas Stratmann “Some talk: Money in Politics”. Noting that every election in the US sets a new record for campaign finance he reviews the literature on five issues regarding the nexus between money and politics, namely, the effect of contributions on elections for legislators, the effect of contributions on elections about issues, the influence of donations on the behaviour of legislators, the determinants of campaign contributions and the reform of campaign finance. The first question of interest is whether the candidate who spends more than his/her opponent wins the election. This inquiry is fraught with conceptual and statistical problems as it needs to take into account the endogeneity of electoral outcomes (that is, spending influences the voting outcome but the expected outcome also influences the sum spent), the quality of the candidates, the partisanship of voters, the cost of political advertising in different geographical areas and whether candidates emphasize issues of policy (“substance”) or valence (“style”). The empirical studies often report conflicting results. Campaign expenditures by incumbents in the US House of Representatives are not related to the share of votes received, but challenger spending does. Similarly, although earlier studies showed that spending by incumbents in the US Senate had a positive and statistically significant effect on incumbent share of votes, later studies cast doubt on the validity of this result. This is a comforting finding if it suggests that voters are not swayed by candidates who are thought to receive contributions in exchange of favours to contributors. However, it opens up a range of new questions, like why candidates are so keen to raise funds for the election contest and what value is in reforming campaign finance and setting spending limits. Similar ambiguity of results characterizes research on campaign expenditures in elections about policy issues: Earlier literature reports results that spending has little effect on voting outcomes, but more recent studies (which try to account for the issue of endogeneity and the preferences of voters) show that spending on campaigns to support a policy proposal is as effective as spending to oppose it. Stratmann then turns to the question of how campaign contributions affect the decisions of politicians. Using meta-analysis to examine the weight of the evidence from 265 previous studies he finds that contributions affect the voting behaviour of legislators. Moving on to the determinants of campaign contributions, research shows that money flows to incumbents in close races, members of powerful legislative committees raise more funds, contributors donate to their political friends, and that contributors donate money to politicians to win access and to influence votes. Stratmann completes his review by looking at US campaign finance reforms and especially limits in contributions and public funding of campaigns. Caps on contributions reduce spending and voter information, but on the other hand, they decrease the number of promises made by candidates to donors, narrow the margin of electoral victory and increase the number of candidates in elections. Public funding of campaigns appears to increase the probability of success of “high-quality” candidates (in terms of voter welfare). 

More thought-provoking ideas appear in the eighth paper, “The eclipse of legislatures: Direct democracy in the 21st century” by John Matsusaka (who also draws on his 2004 book on the subject). First he documents the ascent of direct democracy in the form of deciding policy issues by a referendum vote over the last quarter of the 20th century in the USA. A referendum can be mandated by the constitution; can be binding or advisory; can be called by the government on its policy proposal, or can be called on a policy proposed by the opposition or a group of citizens as prescribed by the law, as in the case of a popular initiatives (when a specified minimum number of voters can force a public vote on a policy), and the recall referendum, a procedure by which voters can remove an elected official from office. He traces the causes of the trend for more referendums to two factors: the rise in the educational attainment of voters, which allows them to be better informed about complex public policy issues, and the fall in information cost, primarily through technological improvements, which allows easier access to information on public policy issues. These two developments have reduced the knowledge advantage that politicians used to hold against ordinary citizens and therefore the benefits of representative democracy. An additional factor noted by Matsusaka has been the erosion of public confidence in the ability of elected representatives to resolve public policy issues. In the concluding essay, the editors add the reduction in the cost of voting itself (by relaxing various constraints on voting - polls open for longer hours, “early voting” and absentee ballot facilities). A fifth factor emerges from examining the increase use of referendums in Western European countries since the 1970s, namely, the “unfreezing” of old political alignments and the decline of social class as the main determinant of voting behaviour, a result brought by the spread of property ownership and consumer choice (Bogdanor 1994). The 20th century offers several examples of dictators abusing the referendum process to legitimize their rule through extra-constitutional procedures. More generally, direct democracy is vulnerable because of the high internal costs it requires in terms of time, effort and other resources necessary for citizens to obtain information and negotiating a decision. Matsusaka carefully reconstructs the case for direct democracy. Reviewing an extensive body of research, he shows how the referendum process can empower the majority of voters to counteract the influence of special interests in the legislature, how the popular initiative can break the monopoly of politicians in controlling the legislative agenda, and reports econometric findings which show that direct democracy can bring “good” economic outcomes in the form of more efficient government spending and a greater percentage of citizens reporting higher levels of happiness. Direct democracy may also lead to better outcomes than indirect when information is widely dispersed and / or value issues are decided so that there is no obvious “right” decision (abortion, gay rights, stem cell research, etc). Being himself a leading researcher in the area, he is also quick to draw attention to the dangers from interest groups hijacking the referendum process under conditions of asymmetric information and how the majority may use the referendum to abuse the minority. For Matsusaka the balance sheet clearly indicates that direct democracy is no worse than indirect, is here to stay and will play an ever increasing role in the 21st century. The important issue therefore is to strike the appropriate balance between direct and indirect democracy. He expects broad policy issues to be resolved by referendums and initiatives and technical, budgeting and regulatory issues to be determined by elected representatives. In an ironic twist of what was the conventional wisdom of a few years back, he also expects large communities (“big cities”) to make more often use of direct democracy than small communities, since politicians in the former will be less likely to understand the divergent preferences of voters.

The ninth paper of the volume, “Corporations, collective actions and corporate governance: One size does not fit all” by Harold Mulherin addresses public choice issues raised in connection to recent headline-grabbing corporate scandals, like those associated with WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing, and Tyco, and the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The latter, we may remember, aims to, amongst other things increase the independence of corporate boards and so raise corporate responsibility. Similarly to political decision making, where voters elect representatives, corporate governance involves delegation of authority to executive managers who run the business, resulting in well-known principal - agent problems of rational ignorance, aligning of incentives, monitoring and control. Mulherin inquires how mechanisms of corporate governance affect corporate performance. He first reviews the literature on four sets of controls on the corporation. (a) The legal, political and regulatory environment which emphasizes the importance of secure property rights. (b) Product and factor markets which determine the production activities side of the firm. (c) Capital markets which relate to the debt-equity structure of the firm and the takeover mechanism as an incentive for competent management. (d) Internal control systems to monitor the performance of the corporation, like stock ownership and the board of directors decision making. Mulherin then embarks in a systematic examination of the determinants of corporate performance based on a sample of 1235 US firms from 40 industries for the year 2000. With respect to the effect of corporate financial policies his regression results show that the dividend yield is smaller in firms characterized by a high share price to earnings (P/E) and the fraction of corporate debt is greater in older industries with low growth potential than in younger industries and smaller in firms with high P/E ratio. Next, he probes into the issue of whether or not dispersion of ownership affects corporate performance. Noting that ownership is in fact an endogenous response to the economic environment within which a firm operates he presents a key-finding, that ownership is significantly less concentrated in firms in regulated industries and warns against “naïve attempts to draw a causal relation from ownership to performance”. The inquiry ends by offering robust evidence on another empirical regularity identified by Yermeck (1996), namely, the larger the number of board directors in a firm, the lower the P/E ratio of the firm and hence its growth performance. The reason for this inverse relationship is sought in the failure of large groups to co-ordinate (a problem familiar from public good provision). One wonders if there is a political analogue to this finding: would a country with a large number of ministers in the cabinet be associated with a low-growth economy? On the strength of the conclusions that governance institutions vary across corporations in response to economic circumstances and corporate governance varies across industries, Mulherin’s argues that policy reforms which treat corporate governance as a “one-size-fits-all” approach are inappropriate and will impose heavier costs on some firms than on others.

The tenth essay by Lawrence Kenny, “The public choice of educational choice”, examines what factors may explain differences in support for education vouchers by the voters and legislators in different States of the US. Vouchers have often been greeted as the potential answer to the quest for policies which will reverse the decline of USA public schools, whose graduates score worse than their peers in international comparisons since the mid-sixties. Public schools are financed by taxes paid by property owners in the local school district including those parents who send their children to private schools. A school voucher is a sum of money given to parents to enrol their children to a school of their choice, rather than the school to which they are assigned on the basis of their residential district. As money follows pupils, schools will compete for pupils improving in the process educational standards to attract and retain pupils. However, this is not the end of the story. When parents with vouchers switch to private schools, fewer taxes need to be raised to finance publicly provided education (since the value of the voucher is typically less than the money spent per pupil in the public school); conceivably, a decrease in the tax revenue for funding public schools may follow. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the attractiveness of “good” public schools diminishes, reducing demand for residential properties in the areas served by good public schools. Property owners in those districts will then suffer capital losses with the introduction of vouchers. They are therefore expected to oppose school vouchers. Another group who opposes the introduction of voucher is unionized public school teachers, who as a result of competition against the private sector may lose some of the privileges. Running linear probability regressions Kenny finds that proposals for education vouchers are more likely to be implemented when they exclude households which already send their children to private schools but are directed to poorer households; they are targeted to specific large, struggling urban school districts; Republicans, especially conservative Republicans, control the executive branch and both chambers of the state legislature. He also finds that charter schools, which operate within the public schools system but are less regulated, are more likely to be approved in places with weak teacher’s unions. 

The final essay by Paul Rubin, “Public choice and tort reform” is a superb example of the analytical power of public choice. It explains how since the 1960s rent seeking activities by legal professionals has penetrated US tort law and expanded its cost to more than 2% of US GDP. The replacement of contract liability by tort liability has been the driving force behind this development. Contract liability means that the contracting parties agree the liability payments to be paid by the producer in case of a product-related injury (reaping therefore the benefits of voluntary market exchanges). On the contrary, under tort liability the court decides the level and type of damage payments. The legal justification of the latter has been the “unequal bargaining power” of the parties and the “public interest”. Rubin documents additional contributory factors to the expansion of tort liability, notably, extension of strict liability from manufacturing defects to design defects, growth in the damages awarded by juries for highly subjective “pain and suffering”, choice of legal jurisdiction by lawyers seeking states and courts which are friendlier to plaintiffs than defendants, and the growth of class action lawsuits. Rubin then discusses the major participants in the tort reform debate, the lawyers, who are the main beneficiaries of the tort liability expansion and are the main opponents of reform, and the business and to a smaller extent the medical doctors, who are the main proponents of reform to reduce their expenses. An interest group can pursue its objectives using either the legislative process by lobbying politicians to secure favourable legislation, or by using the litigation process in the courts in order to secure favourable rulings. Drawing on an earlier study (Rubin et al. 2001) describes how lawyers have a comparative advantage in using the litigation process to expand tort liability, while businesses have a comparative advantage in using the legislative process to reform tort liability. The article closes with a detailed list of unresolved issues and suggestions for further research in the area.

The book ends with a concluding chapter by the editors providing a list of some outstanding questions for research and the message that “the explanatory power of public choice is undeniable”.

Overall this is a marvelous collection of insightful, thorough and authoritative essays. Readers without an expertise in public choice models will appreciate that each contributor to the volume emphasizes concepts and ideas rather than technical rigour. There are a small number of graphs and of tables with statistical estimates derived from standard regression analysis and only one out of the eleven articles presents some simple equations. Some of the literature reviews are deeper and wider than others. However, as it is the case with collections of articles, the reader may be left with a feeling that it contains individual “trees” but there is no “forest”, and that some additional topics should have featured in the volume. The reader is not told why and how the eleven topics were selected and what glues them in the order they are presented. One may also complain that with one exception the empirical record analyzed is centered on the USA, and that only the author of that same article is not (currently) affiliated with a US University. Someone bent on finding fault may point to four typos (on pages 129, 188, 208 and 222). Be that as it may, not a single paper in the collection overlaps with the rest. The reader is presented with a wide portfolio of literature summaries and new ideas but is also spared from repetition and overlap of subjects and reviews - not a mean achievement in a volume of two hundred and fifty pages! 
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